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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction and Overview 
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION AND LEARNING, INDUSTRIAL, 
AND TECHNOLOGY POLICIES IN AFRICA 
Akbar Noman and Joseph E, Stiglitz 
The revival of reasonably rapid growth in Sub-Saharan Africa of about 
5 percent per year for over a decade is all the more welcome for having 
followed a "lost quarter century": per capita income for the region, which 
had started falling toward the end of the 1970s, did not recover to its pre-
vious peak level until after the turn of the century. This is an impressive 
turnaround from what was arguably the longest and deepest economic 
decline anywhere. In the 2000s, six of the world's fastest-growing econo-
mies were in Sub-Saharan Africa (which we refer to simply as Africa): over 
about a decade, annual growth averaged more than 7.5 percent in Angola, 
Chad, Ethiopia, Mo2ambique, Nigeria, and Rwanda. 
There is much promise in the turnaround in Africa. Some talk of 
"Africa Rising," a perspective highlighted by the online debate held 
by The Economist in 2013 titled ''.Africa's Rise: How Real Is the Rise of 
Africa?" Particularly notable are Ethiopia and Rwanda, whose growth 
has not been based on a natural resource boom. In contrast, oil lubri-
cated the rapid growth of Angola, Nigeria, Mozambique, and Chad.' 
Indeed much of the revival of growth in the region is attributable to a 
commodity boom. . 
As we will discuss, while it is difficult to parse the relative roles of 
different causes of improved growth and there is some controversy on 
the role of better policies (and which particular ones), there is a consen-
sus that booming commodity prices and mineral discoveries-especially 
oil-have played a vital role. There is also widespread agreement that 
improved _macroeconomic management-at least avoidance of serious 
inflation and volatility-and debt relief made significant contributions. 
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Nonetheless, African countries typically have made little or no progress 
in transforming their economies, notably with respecr to reversing dein~ 
dustrialization that began in the late 1970s. The share of manufacturing 
in 2012 barely reached the level of the mid-197os. Related to this lack of 
transformation is the woeful inadequacy of generating "decent" jobs, forc-
ing large proportions of the rapidly expanding labor force into very low-
productivity agriculrure and the informal sector, which arguably disguise 
ar least as much unemployment as the jobs they reveal. 
In the words of an impressive and wide-ranging report of the African 
Center for Economic Transformation (ACET), one of Africas leading 
think-tanks, "the recent economic growth, while welcome, will not by 
itself sustain development on the conrinent. To ensure that growth is 
sustainable and conrinues to improve the lives of the many, countries 
now need to vigorous!:y promote economic transformation" (ACET 2014, l, 
iralics added). 
The main objecrive of the contributions in this volume is to shed light 
on how to go abour doing so. They emphasize the viral role of indus-
trial policies. Ir is perhaps noteworthy that the two economies among 
rhe fastest-growing in Africa in this century did not rely on an oil boom: 
Ethiopia and Rwanda pursued to varying degrees deliberate policies of 
governmenr interventions of the type we label industrial policies. These 
two countries were consciously and explicitly influenced by the success-
ful experiences with industrial policies of the most successful East Asian 
countries (see World Bank 1993; Stiglitz and Uy 1996). 
We provide a quick overview of Africa's development experience in the 
next three short sections in order to provide a context !Or rhe two longer 
ones concerning the main themes of this volume. "Staric Efficiency vs. 
Dynamic Gains: Learning, Industrial, and Technology Policies" examines 
the need and possibilities of learning, industrial, and technology policies 
in the region, and the last section provides an overview of rhe other chap-
ters in this volume and how they contribute to rhar aim. 
AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT EXPERIENCE 
Africas "lost quarter cenrury," along with rhe economic meltdown of the 
former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the transition to a market 
economy, possibly ranks as among rhe worst economic disasrers since 
rhe Industrial Revolution. 2 The lost quarter century was a period not 
jusr of deindusrrialization but also of declining per capira income. After 
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stagnating in the late 1970s, average per capita income fell steadily from 
1980 to 1995 and did not recover to its 1974 level until 2004. The share of 
manufacturing in GDP shrank to such an extent that in 2012 it was lower 
than what it had been in 1965. 
In a region as large and diverse as Africa, averages conceal much. Even 
b'efore the recent acceleration of growth, there were several successes in 
the region on assorted dimensions of development in different periods, 
including GDP growth and managing the resource curse. Some natural 
resource-abundant economies such as C6te d'Ivoire, Mozambique, and, 
above all, Botswana (the fastest-growing economy in the world from 1960 
to 2000) have experienced significant periods of fairly good growth. Even 
more impressive was the achievement of growth exceeding 5 percent per 
year for substantial periods in countries such as Ethiopia, Ghana (pre-
oil), Tanzania, Rwanda, and Mauritius, which are not blessed/cursed by 
natural resource wealth. 
As noted earlier, much of the growth in Africa since the turn of the 
century is attriburable to booming commodity prices and hydrocarbon 
discoveries.' But there are many instances in various parts of the world of 
resource-rich countries mismanaging their wealth, demonstrating that an 
abundance of resources and booming prices are no guarantee of success. 
We turn now to the following questions: Why did the region go 
through such a prolonged period of economic decline? What caused the 
decline in per capita incomes, the failure not only to make the economic 
transformation that was going on, say, in East Asia, bur to move in the 
opposite direction, to deindustrialize? What are the lessons for future pol-
icy that emerge from this review of these past failures? 
The period of Africa's severest economic decline, from 1980 to 1995, 
was an era of a multitude of reform programs reflecting external advice 
and conditionalities based on a brand of economics that came to be 
labeled the "Washington Consensus" (WC).• These policies reflected 
what became the dominant orthodoxy in economics: neo-liberalism. In 
our other writings (Noman and Stiglitz 2012 and forthcoming), we have 
explained the fallacies and failures of those policies and their contribution 
ro the lost quarter century in Africa. But for the unabashed proponents 
of the Washington Consensus, the problem was not that the policies were 
mistaken but that they needed to be intensified and implemented betrer. 
The failures of policies also gave rise to a search for other ingredients 
of successful development, going beyond the Washington Consensus-
including notably a focus on "governance." Governance is, of course, 
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important. But as we have argued elsewhere, it was mistaken to artribute 
the failure of the Washington Consensus policies simply to governance: 
Africa's experience reveals the limitations of arbitrary and generalized 
explanations, especially when they confuse cause and effect, and ends and 
means (Noman and Stiglitz 2014). 
Policies have to be designed to be able to be administered by govern-
ments with particular competencies. The failure to do so was certainly 
central to the failure of the WC policies. But policies should also have 
aimed to strengthen competencies; instead, many of the WC policies 
actually worked in the opposite direction. 
Of course, as we also wrote elsewhere, economics does not have much 
to offer as solutions to states that are failed or mired in armed conflict; but 
it is too simple to blame economic failure on political failure. The former 
also contributes to the larter (Noman and Stiglitz 2014). At any rate, we 
exclude from our purview here the rather different set of issues raised by 
the research on states embroiled in severe conflicts or that have failed. 
Just as there is controversy surrounding the causes of the lost quarter 
century, there is controversy about the causes and sustainability of Africa's 
growth resurgence in the twenty-first century. 
Perhaps predictably, advocates of the WC policies believe that Africa's 
recovery is due to those policies and is sustainable-if only the countries 
persist in their adherence to the WC policies. That interpretation ascribes 
relatively little weight to the boom in commodity prices and mineral 
discoveries and to the success of countries like Ethiopia, Botswana, and 
Rwanda that, while adopting some of the WC consensus policies, resisted 
others. It glosses over the deindustrialization that accompanied the WC 
policies and the fact that outside of the natural resource sector, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) has remained anemic. It ignores too the particu-
lar failures of some of the critical reforms in some of the countries in such 
areas as agriculture and finance. 
The continuing controversies arise in part from the difficulties of 
establishing indisputable causal links between economic policies and 
outcomes. Reform programs may fail because of their inherent weak-
nesses (bad policies, or at least policies inappropriate to the circum-
stances of the economy), because they are not adequately implemented, 
or because of unanticipated exogenous shocks, and it is often difficult to 
parse out the relative role played by each of these. Still we can examine 
whether there are reforms in the reform programs that can enhance the 
likelihood of success. 
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Consider the ,issue of implementation: advocates of the WC policies 
often attribute disappointing results to failures in implementation. Earlier 
we noted that part of the explanation fur the problems of implementa-
tion is that the 'cprograms" were not designed to take into account the 
strengths and limitations of those who were supposed to implement them. 
PACING AND SEQUENCING OF REFORMS 
Aside from such implementation issues, there were often even more fun-
damental weaknesses in the reform programs, stemming from insufficient 
attention to the pacing and sequencing of reforms. 
Sequencing is especially important because economic reforms to 
remove distortions confront the problem of the second best: eliminating 
some of many distortions may make matters worse. This is clearly dem-
onstrated by Africa's experience with, for example, the financial sector, 
agricultural pricing, and trade policy reforms. The competitive market-
place that the reform advocates hoped would arise spontaneously did not 
emerge-partly because some of the reforms that would have enabled the 
emergence had not yet been put into place. While this argues for com-
prehensiveness in reforms, limitations in the capacity for implementing 
reforms point to the vital importance of prioritization and sequencing. 
Thus one lesson of the failed programs in Africa is that reforms need 
to be mindful not just of the second-best dilemma but also of the absorp-
tive capacity of the country-not only governmental capacity but also 
the ability of agents to digest and respond to a myriad of changes. Any 
particular reform program has transaction costs and opportunity costs. 
Information about reforms and their implications is neither costless nor 
instantaneously and universally available. 
Moreover, no set of reforms is ever perfect. Any successful implemen-
tation process must entail learning about both what is working and what 
is not. Successful reform programs thus must create institutional frame-
works for learning and adaptation. 
In addition, to be sustainable, reforms have to have "political buy-in." 
They cannot be seen to be imposed by outsiders, especially when those 
outsiders lack legitimacy as a result of a conflict of economic interests or a 
colonial heritage. Conditionality was, as a result, often counterproductive. 
This does not constitute a general argument for always going slowly: 
there may be threshold effects that require decisive, critical, minimum 
efforts. Thus, for example, when Ethiopia launched its reform program 
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in the early 1990s, it moved rapidly on selected fronts: establishing macro-
economic stability, dismantling collectivized agriculture, and establishing 
a system of famine prevention. But Ethiopia's reforms have been much 
more measured and gradual in other areas, such as financial liberalization. 
While some have suggested that in some areas Ethiopia could have moved 
faster (for example, in telecommunications5), its mixture of speediness 
and gradualism has served the country well overall, with its economy 
growing at a rate in the vicinity of IO percent per year for nearly a decade 
before the global crisis of 2008. Even afrer the crisis, its economy main-
tained much of the growth momentum. One welcome consequence was 
that the proportion of the population living below the poverty line of 
$1.25 per day-in purchasing power parity terms-fell from 56 percent in 
2000 to 31 percent in 2011.6 
Further afield, perhaps the most notable case of combining fast and 
slow reforms is that of China; its success stands in marked contrast with 
the "shock therapy'' of the former Soviet Union (see Stiglitz 1999). In 
China the initial focus was predominantly if not exclusively on agricul-
ture, and subsequently on two-track price reforms and creating Township 
and Village Enterprises. Only later did it engage in large-scale privati-
zations. AB another example: it first invited foreign firms only in joint 
ventures; much later, it allowed foreign financial firms to enter, and then 
only with extensive restrictions, and it still has not fully liberalized its 
capital accounts. In the case of the other mega country, India, a different 
sort of gradualism may have worked (see Ahluwalia 2002). 
The issue is thus not one of how fast or how slow, but one of priorities 
and sequencing given the country's capacities for implementation, the 
transactions and opportunity costs of any set of policy measures, and the 
country's ability to assimilate information about the successes and failures 
ot each policy measure and to adapt the policies in response. An approach 
that allows for experimentation and flexibility with successes scaled up 
and failures quickly abandoned is an important ingredient of success. 
To take the example of financial sector reforms, liberalization of inter-
est rates to make them market-determined typically faced the problem 
of financial markets that were at best thin and highly imperfect or at 
worst non-existent. The all-too-frequent result was exceptionally high 
real interest rates (a range of 12 to 15 percent was not uncommon) and 
the absence oflong-term credit for investment. Even the United States 
and Europe learned in 2008 that financial sector "reforms" could be 
taken too far; strong regulations are necessary to maintain an efficient, 
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competitive, and stable financial system. This is even more so in devel-
oping countries. 
Privatization, trade policy, and related reforms compounded the prob-
lems posed by the "reformed" financial sector. While there was much to be 
said for rationalizing and liberalizing the trade regimes and public sector 
enterprises, the structure, pacing, and sequencing of reforms in these areas 
led to the deindustrialization of Africa instead of the emergence of a more 
competitive and vibrant sector and one that attracted foreign investment 
in non-extractive activities. Domestic firms faced strong competition from 
abroad--competitors who had better access to finance at attractive rates. 
Not surprisingly, many did not survive. Trade policies were one sided: 
the advanced countries did not simultaneously liberalize their markets. 
Escalating tariffs were designed to keep poor African countries supply-
ing raw materials and to prevent them from entering into higher value-
added activities. A lack of investment in infrastructure meant that even 
were firms able to produce something that might be desired in developed 
countries, the "internal barriers" to trade remained significant. (Aid for 
trade did not enter seriously into the trade agenda until 2005.) 
INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNANCE 
The question of why the neo-liberal reforms did not work as expected 
led to a renewed interest in institutions. As Thandika Mkandawire (2012) 
states, the failure of the "good policies" of "getting prices right" prompted 
those multilateral institutions and aid donors advocating such policies to 
turn their attention to an institutional agenda. 
There is a large literature on the development state emphasizing the role 
of the state in successful development, not just in the East Asian "miracle" 
economies, but also in many of the now-developed countries elsewhere.? 
This literature notes the important role the state played in creating insti-
tutional mechanisms for intetventions that accelerated development. 
What constitutes good institutions, how they are created, and how 
institutional deficiencies are addressed are vital for developmental suc-
cess, but there are no easy answers. The 2008 crisis exposed fundamental 
institutional weaknesses in the United States (including in some of its 
most venerable institutions; for example, the Federal Resetve). But here 
too the neo-liberal WC reforms setved Africa poorly. Some of the poli-
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Belatedly, as the failure of the WC policies became evident, blame 
was shifted to deficiencies in public governance. These concerns led to 
the emergence of a particular agenda of institutional reforms in Africa 
under the label of "good governance" (GG). This agenda was based on a 
particular view of the relative roles of the state and markets. It assigned 
what Meles Zenawi (2012) refers to as a "night-watchman" role for the 
state, confining it to what is required to make markets work better. (Even 
then, the agenda was excessively narrow, paying, fur instance, too little 
attention to the importance of financial regulation.) In Mushtaq Khan's 
words, this so-called good governance agenda is more accurately referted 
to as an agenda of "market-enhancing governance" that emphasizes what 
Thandika Mkandawire calls "restraining'' as opposed to "transformative" 
institutions in Africa (see Zenawi 2012, Khan 2012, and Mkandawire 
2012). The focus of GG is on public governance pertaining to bureau-
cratic hurdles, corruption, feeble enforcement of contracts and orher 
laws, and generally poor implementation of policy initiatives. 
No doubt, corruption arid lack of competence of state institutions 
can lead to poor economic outcomes. But the GG agenda has been used 
to promote a particular view of which institutions are important for 
development and how they should be designed: a view that is embed-
ded in neo-Jiberalism and its precepts on the relative roles of the state 
and markets, and a view that gives short shrift to other institutional 
arrangements, such as the ·role of cooperatives and other not-for-profit 
institutions.8 
This view is profoundly ahistorical. It sees flawed public institutions 
as hindrances to markets performing in the way neo-liberalism presumes 
them to. It neglects attention to institutions that improve on or substitute 
for markets (for example, by addressing market failures). 
An influential argument for the importance of the standard GG 
agenda is based on astatistical relationships between growth and gov-
ernance as measured by the standard indicators. But as Mushtaq Khan 
has shown within developing countries and emerging markets, there is 
no such meaningful statistical relationship. More precisely, developing 
countries can be divided into high-growth "converging" economies and 
low-growth "diverging" economies, and within each group there is no 
relationship between growth and the measures of governance employed. 
The GG agenda encapsulates intrinsically desirable ends that may well 
be good for and in turn be an outcome of development. For the most 
part, they embody worthy ends that are to be valued and pursued in their 
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own rights. But the GG reform agenda that has emerged is neither neces-
sary nor sufficient for economic success. We noted earlier the importance 
of setting priorities and sequencing reforms. The critical questions, typi-
cally not addressed by the advocates of the GG agenda, are as follows: 
Which of the GG reforms be given priority? and How should the priori-
tization and sequencing of these reforms be meshed with other economic 
reforms? Arguably, no country has ever implemented the GG agenda first 
and then developed-neither the now-advanced economies in the past 
nor the rapidly transforming ones of East Asia today. This may be partly 
because poverty and stagnation provide a context that is inimical to a full-
fledged GG agenda. 
What is needed is not a simplistic one-size-fits-all GG agenda, but 
a pragmatic one that is tailored to the particular stage of development, 
the key issues confronting economic management at that stage, and the 
particular circumstances of the country. The so-called developmental 
states of East Asia, as well as those in which development occurred befure 
World War II, intervened successfully in ways that required governance 
capacities other than simply those adumbrated under the GG agenda. 
The growth-enhancing governance reforms that we advocate here pri-
oritize those capabilities that facilitate learning, in particular via industrial 
policies in the sense and of the type we outline further on. Africis experi-
ence highlights the importance of not neglecting such policies. 
Markets on their own typically do not manage structural transforma-
tions well.9 This is true even in developed countries, but even more so 
in developing countries. What is needed are industrial and trade policies 
that promote learning, the subject to which we now turn. 
STATIC EFFICIENCY VS. DYNAMIC GAINS: LEARNING, 
INDUSTRIAL, AND TECHNOLOGY POLICIES 
Industrial policy in the broad sense in which the term has come to be 
used refers to any action that aims to alter the allocation of resources (or 
the choice of technology) from what the market, left to itself, would bring 
about. In this broad sense, industrial policy is not confined to industry; 
it also refers to policies aimed at other sectors, notably modern services 
like finance or information technology and agriculture. Indeed the green 
revolution in South Asia can be said to be a prime example of successful 
industrial policy.'0 Languishing African agriculture has had little or no 
such policy support. 
I 
I ,, 
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In one sense, industrial policies are unavoidable: all countries have 
industrial policies whether they know it or not. Public expenditure (for 
example, the location of highways and the design of the education system) 
and regulatory and legal regimes (for example, bankruptcy law) affect 
the utilization of resources. Our concern here, however, is narrower: we 
are concerned with the deliberate actions intended to promote particular 
kinds of activities, especially those that have come to be referred to as 
learning, industrial, and technology (LIT) policies (we will use that term 
interchangeably with the more f.uniliar "industrial policy"). 
Such policies are directed at improving the dynamic capacities of the 
economy. Allocating a given amount of resources at a point in time in a 
way that is consistent with static efficiency, as desirable as it may seem, 
may actually impede development and. growth. These phenomena and 
the associated societal transformation depend on learning in all of its 
forms-including closing the knowledge gap that separates developing 
and developed countries. 
But there may be a conflict between policies that enhance static effi-
ciency and those that contribute to learning (see Greenwald and Stiglitz 
2006 and 2or4a, b, and c). Striking the right balance is at the core of 
success in achieving growth and development. The neo-liberal WC poli-
cies paid no attention to learning, seemingly unaware of the potential 
conflict, and thus failed to strike the right balance. 
Patent laws illustrate the trade-off: they restrict the availability of 
knowledge, a public good, and confer monopoly power, thus entailing 
static inefficiency, but the rationale for these "distortions" is that the 
resulting loss in static efficiency will be more than offset by the dynamic 
gains from investment in new technologies that they encourage.n Patents 
also, of course, give rise to rents-a potent demonstration that rents can 
be channeled in ways that promote economic progress.,, Building gover-
nance capabilities to ensure that rent seeking is so directed ought to be a 
vital aim of reforms that serve to move the economy to a sustained higher 
development and growth path. 
The proponents of the Washington Consensus focused on the risks 
and failures of attempts to promote learning with industrial policies. 
They suggested that such policies were inevitably costly and invariably 
doomed to failure. Indeed "industrial policy" acquired such bad ~onno­
tations that it could be said to have become unmentionable in polite 
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But recent years have provided a strong theoretical basis for such 
policies in the market failures inevitably associated with learning and 
strucrural transformation. Moreover, there have been notable historical 
successes of such policies-not only in East Asia, but even in the United 
States. Africa's experience shows the enormous price of neglecting the 
pursuit of these policies (see Lin and Stiglitz 2014). 
LIT policies are multidimensional and take many different forms 
across and within countries. The most fumous examples are those of the 
so-called East Asian developmental state economies, especially Korea, 
Taiwan, Singapore, and an earlier-era Japan. Japan is by no means the 
only developed country that pursued LIT policies: they were central to 
almost all countries that "caught up" with the technological ftontier and 
became developed. (Ha-Joon Chang documents this insightfully and 
comprehensively.'') 
There are, of course, good theoretical reasons why LIT policies are 
desirable. They focus on learning, especially by infant industries and 
economies (which are so prototypical in Africa); they address externali-
ties, knowledge spillovers, coordination failures, and deficiencies in risk 
and capital markets. 
They are not or at any rate need not be about picking winners and 
losers, as the issue is often misleadingly phrased. Of course, properly 
designed LIT policies aim to minimize the risks of picking "losers," of 
state capture, and of industrial policies shifting away from their catalytic 
role in development and addressing deficiencies in markets. 
One of the major risks of LIT policies that its critics have emphasized 
is that such policies are vulnerable to capture and corruption. But such 
risks are by no means the preserve of LIT policies, as illustrated by the 
fuct that central banks in the advanced industrial country were "captured" 
by the financial sector they were supposed to regulate. 
Indeed the agenda of liberalization and privatization in Africa, as else-
where, that was argued for on the basis that it would limit the scope for 
capture and corruption, was actually "captured" and became the source 
of enormous corruption in many countries, both in the developed and 
the developing worlds.4 Frameworks that were created gave rise to enor-
mous rents (both in dealings with government-in buying public assets 
at below fuir market values and selling the government goods and services 
at inflated prices-and in exploiting workers and consumers through, for 
instance, the greater scope they provided for anticompetitive practices 
and market manipulation). 
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Indeed liberalization and privatization have arguably been a major 
source of corruption; major contributors to the high level of inequality 
that marks many African countries and a major impediment to develop-
ment and growth. Mineral rights have been sold to foreign firms in pro-
cesses that have given rise to corruption and have been totally divorced 
from any benefits oflearning, technology acquisition, or spillovers that 
might have emanated from the development of these resources." 
The fact that there have been some "failures" in industrial policies is 
no more a reason for eschewing such policies than the failures in macro, 
monetary; and financial policies that were so evident in the run-up to the 
2008 crisis are an argument against having macro, monetary, and finan-
cial policies. In the afrermath of the 2008 crisis, we have sought to learn 
from those failures. So, too, should we seek to learn from the failures of 
industrial policies. Whilst LIT policies have risks, they also have rewards. 
Indeed there are few successful economies in which governments have not 
pursued such policies. Arguably, Africa has paid a high price for foregoing 
the rewards of LIT policies. 
Limitations in state capacity (deficiencies in governance) may, of 
course, affect the form that industrial policies take. Several African 
countries-Ethiopia, Kenya, Mauritius, South Africa, and Rwanda-
have shown to varying degrees that they can manage industrial policies 
and use them to enhance growth. The success stories highlighted in sev-
eral of the contributions to this volume show the potential for industrial 
policies in Africa (for example, the contributions of Abebe and Schaefer, 
Hosono, Primi, and Shimada). 
The availability of finance on appropriate terms is a key element of 
success with LIT policies and indeed more generally is necessary to pro-
mote growth. The financial crisis of 2008 and the ensuing recession have 
drawn attention to the issue of making finance serve the economy rather 
than the other way round. In Africa, the reforms of the financial sec-
tor combined with macroeconomic stability served to do away with the 
highly negative real interest rates that had become common in Africa.16 
Bur financial liberalization largely failed in Africa not just because it 
led in some cases to instability, but more ofren than not because it sad-
dled Africa with very high real interest rates and a dearth oflong-term 
credit. At the same time, the banking sector has tended to have excess 
liquidity, preferring short-term government securities to lending. 
Perhaps in no other area did the reform programs of Africas lost quar-
ter century ignore the lessons of success in development, especially of 
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East Asia, more extensively than in finance. The analysis of the extraor-
dinary success of East Asian economies has shown the vital role played 
by interventions by the state in finance (see, for example, World Bank 
1993). Stiglitz and Uy (1996) brought out the role of financial restraint (or 
mild financial repression) that held real interest rates low and enhanced 
access to and confidence in the financial system. The East Asian countries 
employed a variety of forms of intervention that enhanced the stability of 
the financial system and thereby savers' confidence in it, and that lowered 
transactions costs. These were highly effective in mobilizing savings-
more so than would have been the case had there been unregulated finan-
cial markets with high real interest rates. 
Ensuring access to long-term credit at moderate real rates, sometimes 
through development banks, promoted long-term investments that are 
so essential to sustainable growth. Development banks in East Asia and 
elsewhere have played an important role in encouraging the kind of eco-
nomic transformation based on learning and the LIT policies that we 
discussed previously. Development banks have made important contribu-
tions in other regions at different stages: in South Asia, especially India 
and Pakistan in the 1950s and 1960s, as well as Latin America, including 
notably Brazil, Chile, and Colombia, not just then but also more recently. 
Stephany-Griffith Jones with Ewa Karwowski's contribution to this 
volume emphasizes the importance of development banks. An African 
example is the highly positive role played by a development bank in 
recent years in one of the very few economies in Africa that still has such 
a bank: Ethiopia, where financing by the development bank was crucial 
to the impressive success with industrial policies that promoted the devel-
opment of horticulture and manufactured leather exports, as the case 
studies by Girum Abebe and Florian Schaefer in this volume bring out. 
While there have been failures (though nothing to match the scope 
and breadth of the failures associated with America's banking system), 
there have been notable successes and considerable learning by the most 
successful of such banks on how to increase the odds of success.'? We now 
have a much better understanding of these lessons than we did in the era 
of a naive faith in state interventions that neglected the risks of govern-
ment failure. Clearly the answer is not to replace that faith with nai"ve 
belief in unfettered markets that neglects the pervasive market failures by 
ignoring the limitations of markets, for example in providing long-term 
credit or credit to SMEs. (Even the United Srates, with its well-developed 
financial markets, has found it desirable to have active srate provision of 
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credit: the Small Business Administration plays a major role in the provi-
sion of small business loans, the Export-Import Bank is a major provider 
oflending support, especially for exporters like Boeing, and, in recent 
years, more than 90 percent of all mortgages have been underwritten by 
the federal government.)'8 
The presumption of the neo-liberal economists was that development 
banks, being public institutions, couldn't work. (There was a certain 
irony in this: many of the strongest critics of the development banks were 
economists in the World Bank and other multilateral development banks 
and from the IMF-all public institutions.) They ignored the successes 
and focused on the failures. Not surprisingly, the response of the WC 
reform program was not to reform development banks to improve their 
efficiency and efficacy but to dismantle them. 
As with all areas of reform and good economic management, the issue 
is one of learning the lessons of successes and failures. Development 
banking raises governance issues that underline the salience of the 
"growth-enhancing governance" that we have emphasized. Of course, as 
in any area, there are downsides. But there is also enormous upside poten-
tial. This stance against development banks-like the more general WC 
stance against industrial policies-made Africa pay the price of foregoing 
the rewards of development banks. The countries could have designed 
their development banks-including structuring their governance and 
scaling them appropriately-to get the risk-reward ratio right. The costs 
of not having a development bank have been particularly high for those 
countries that have demonstrated a capacity to implement effective indus-
trial policies. Countries that can do so might be expected to have the 
capacity to run an effective development bank. 
THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS VOLUME 
As Africa seeks economic transformation for sustained growth, its poli-
cymakers need to reverse the tendencies of WC reforms, which, on the 
one hand pay too little attention to the benefits oflearning, to critical 
issues of pacing, sequencing, and to the development of state capacity, 
including the capacity to implement reforms; and on the other hand 
place too much faith in markets as efficient, stable, and developmentally 
transformative. 
Given the failure of the structural adjustment policies, it was natu-
ral that the reform agenda be broadened. Proper governance-both in 
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rhe public and private sectors-is important for good economic per-
formance, but we have argued that what we referred to as the good 
governance agenda-the governance agenda that was pushed by the 
internarional insritutions-is in some respects too narrow. It focuses on 
restraining the role of government and limiting its role to "enabling" the 
private sector, rather than developing state capacities that have marked 
the development stare and have played such an important role in many 
of the most successful countries. But it is also roo ambitious: just like 
the economic policy agenda ignored issues of sequencing and pacing, 
so too for the governance agenda. We have argued, for instance, that 
industrial policies, including development banks, have played a critical 
role in many counrries, including Africa, and could .in the future play an 
even more important role. Several of the contributions to this volume 
buttress thar case. 
We have illustrated these ideas looking at several concrete issues, in 
particular industrial policy and the reform of financial markets. But 
each area of policy can be viewed from the perspective of a development 
transformation. Consider, for instance, exchange rate policy. In natural 
resource-rich economies, without appropriate inrerventions, the exchange 
rate will be too high, inhibiting both export- and import-competing 
industries, a major contriburor ro rhe "resource curse." In Africa, this 
common problem is compounded in some heavily aid-dependent econo-
mies by aid inflows. But there are notable examples of both countries 
that are resource rich (Malaysia and Chile) and those that are not (like 
China) that have managed rheir exchange rares in ways that have pro-
moted growth and a developmental transformation. 
Today is a particularly opportune time for a change in Africa's develop-
ment strategy in these directions. There are major changes occurring in 
the global economic landscape. China provides a very large and rapidly 
growing market for African exports, and not just for its natural resources. 
Moreover, wages in China are rising. As Danny Leipziger and Shahid 
Yusuf's chapter points out, there will be "space" in world markets for 
labor-intensive, simple manufacturers that Africa could easily occupy 
and, eventually, for less labor-intensive and more complex manufactur-
ers as well. To the extent such a window opens, it might not be for long: 
other low-income economies could fill the void rapidly. This consider-
ation enhances the urgency of the sort of trade, indusrrial, and financial 
policy reforms that we suggest should be high on rhe agenda of policy 
reforms in the region. 
I 6 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Several of the chapters in this volume make the general case for 
industrial policies.19 Differences in emphasis and nuances enrich our 
understanding of these policies, the sources of their successes, and their 
limitations. Hence we prefer to allow the different authors to present 
their views, even at the cost of some repetition, rather than impose a uni-
form view confined to this chapter. 
In chapter 2, Ha-Joan Chang elaborates on the case for industrial poli-
cies in Africa and emphasizes its feasibility. In doing so he addresses what 
is often cited as a special constraint on success with industrial policies in 
Africa: its alleged institutional, political economy and "structural" pecu-
liarities. He notes the important role that industrial policies played not 
only in the "miracle economies" of East Asia but also in the develop-
ment of the now-developed countries, including notably in the United 
Kingdom and the United States, as well as many developing countries 
across all regions. 
Chang then proceeds to demolish "Afro-pessimism," which holds that 
some peculiarly African sttuctural factors of climate, geography, culture, 
and history act against success with industrial policies in the region. 
Chang notes the heterogeneity of Africa and compares African countries 
with other countries at similar stages of development, including today's 
rich countries, and finds these constraints to be much exaggerated.20 For 
example, he notes that the fact that many, if not most, of today's rich 
countries faced similar constraints. They are not insutmountable. On cli-
mate, Chang points out that having a cold one also has its disadvantages 
and quotes Aristotle, who expounds the view that northern European 
countries were handicapped by their cold climates, reflected in their peo-
ple being "full in spirit but lacking in intelligence and skills." Chang also 
provides some splendid examples of how people in more developed coun-
tries held similar prejudices against the less developed countries, includ-
ing the English toward the Germans in the mid-nineteenth century and 
Australians, Americans, and the British variously toward Japan and Korea 
in the early twentieth century. 
In sum, Chang emphasizes that many of these so-called structural 
arguments confuse the symptoms of underdevelopment with their causes. 
So do many other arguments relating to institutions, political economy, 
the resource curse, bureaucratic capabilities, and so forth. He notes the 
importance oflearning by doing in managing industrial and other devel-
opment policies, akin to such learning in production, and that these 
capacities can be built up reasonably quickly. 
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Much ofHa-Joon Chang's chapter is devoted to the nexus of political 
economy, rent seeking, and state capabilities. He notes that the tendency 
to assume that the alleged constraints on African development-including 
those reflected in ''Afro-pessimism"-make industrial policies particularly 
likely to fail has little basis. Ai; he points out, "Industrial policies are not 
necessarily more demanding in institutional or political economy terms 
than many other types of policies." 
Chang's setting of the stage is followed in the next four chapters by a 
series of case studies. These are followed by contributions on the financial 
sector, growth and development strategies, and finally on assessment of 
overall policy regimes, in particular a critical examination of the World 
Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). 
Chapter 3 by Akio Hosono examines the lessons for Africa from what 
it deems to be five "outstanding cases" of success with industrial poli-
cies. These cases are highly varied both in terms of the type of sectors as 
well as country contexts. Hosono looks at (r) automobiles in Thailand; 
(z) the "Cerrado" in Brazil (which was transformed from a huge tract of 
barren land to high-productivity agriculture); (3) the garment industry 
in Bangladesh; (4) salmon in Chile; and (5) Singapore's upgrading of its 
industrial sector from a labor-intensive sector to a knowledge-intensive one. 
Hosono seeks to extract insights from these rich case studies on how 
the various considerations that go into the making of industrial policy 
interact in practice in successful cases. He focuses in particular on the 
acquisition of capabilities, the creation of a learning society, using and 
altering factor endowments to move from static to dynamic compara-
tive advantage, compensation for the positive externalities generated 
by the costs of discovery by pioneer firms, and the management of the 
pressures generated by globalization and the ideology and interests of 
"free-marketers." 
Hosono's five case studies illustrate how the general principles of good 
industrial policy vary in their translations into different contexts. But 
they also illustrate the mutual causality between industrial development 
and economic transformation on the one hand, and the "constant devel-
opment of capabilities and knowledge through learning" on the other. 
In the case of Singapore in particular, Hosono emphasizes the crucial 
role of "learning to learn." These cases also serve to bring out that rea-
sonably good institutional "islands" created for specific purposes, as dis-
tinct from an overhaul of the entire institutional structure, can be highly 
effective. In this, it nicely complements Ha-Joon Chang's contention that 
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inadequacies of bureaucratic and associated capabilities do not present 
an insurmountable barrier to success of industrial policies in low-income 
countries or Africa. Hosono's chapter also highlights the important role 
that the development of physical infrastructure plays as an instrument of 
industrial policy. 
The next two chapters focus on Ethiopia, probably the most nota-
ble case of successful industrial policy in Africa. Ethiopia has particu-
larly relevant and important lessons for the region. In this overview of 
the contents of the volume, we assess the Ethiopian cases in particular 
detail. Its late prime minister Meles Zanawi (2012) articulated an explicit 
and sophisticated case for Africa to learn from East Asian successes, par-
ticularly in the area of industrial policies (and those policies have been 
endorsed and continued by the government formed by his successor). 
Go Shimada's case study of Ethiopia aims, inter alia, to illustrate the 
importance of disaggregating learning. He notes the prominence given 
to acquisition of technology (technological knowledge) and skills in the 
relevant literature on Africa and the neglect of other types of knowledge, 
especially knowledge related to policy formulation and implementation 
and to managerial skills. He examines the case of a program in Ethiopia to 
support productivity and quality enhancement by providing basic man-
agement skills and improving management practices at the factory floor 
level. This approach labeled kaizen requires very modest capital invest-
ment and focuses instead on a regular process of improving management 
and organizational capabilities within a firm in a participatory manner, 
that is, involving both managers and workers (kaizen was introduced in 
Japan in 1955). 
A pilot project covering twenty-eight firms in five sectors-agro-
processing, chemicals, metals, leather, and textiles-had quite a remark-
able impact in as short a time as six months. With no additional 
investment, the average benefir for a firm was around 500,000 Ethiopian 
Birr (USD 30,000) over the period. This was equivalent to almost USD 
75 per employee, roughly equal to the prevailing gross monthly wage. The 
other aspect of this project pertained to improving bureaucratic capabil-
ity, especially in policy coordination and implementation, the results of 
which are not so easily assessed (especially given the short time period of 
six months covered in the evaluation). Go Shimada argues for a compre-
hensive approach to learning, which disaggregates different elements of 
learning and devises suitable instruments for each of them. He holds that 
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"managerial" and "policy" learning are important and deserve far more 
attention than they have tended to receive. 
Girum Abebe and Florian Schaefer narrow the focus to two sectors in 
Ethiopia, at the same time widening it by examining a greater range of 
industrial policy instruments. We summarize their chapter in some detail 
as it raises, like Hosono's contribution, a wide range of issues concern-
ing industrial policy, and it does so in an exclusively African context. 
These sectors were an important part of Ethiopia's success over the past 
decade. Ethiopia's GDP grew at ro.6 percent per year between 2004 and 
2on compared to the average of 5.2 percent for Sub-Saharan Africa." (As 
we noted, much of that region's growth reflected a commodity boom, 
especially new discoveries of oil amid soaring prices of oil. By contrast, 
Ethiopia is a resource-poor country.) 
Their focus is on floriculture and leather processing. These are sec-
tors that have developed rapidly, with significant overall impact on the 
economy. Exports of floriculture rose from a paltry USD 0.15 million in 
1997 to USD 2ro million in 201r. Promotion and export of leather goods 
was a more gradual process. After initially rising slowly from USD $67 
million in 2004/05 to USD $I04 million in 2010/n, leather goods are now 
taking off dramatically, with a major Chinese shoe producer, Hujian, hav-
ing established a huge plant in Ethiopia. Thls came about after a meeting 
with the late prime minister Meles Zenawi on hls visit to China in 2on. 
Presumably the capabilities built up in the sector also influenced the deci-
sion to invest in Ethiopia. The company has already begun to produce 
some 2,000 pairs of shoes per day for designer labels and to employ some 
1,600 workers. Hujian plans to expand its production rapidly, with the aim 
of generating USD $4 billion worth of exports per year within a decade. 
The growth in these two sectors alone represents a significant transfor-
mation of the Ethlopian economy, whose total exports in 2012 amounted 
to about USD $3 billion. Thls is akin to the role of garments in Bangladesh, 
but the "transformation" is less likely to be confined to one sector, as 
Ethlopia seems to be pursuing more broad-based and deliberate industrial 
policies, as also suggested in Go Shlmada's contribution in this volume. 
One of the key issues of LIT policies concerns how learning comes 
about. Similar to the case of Bangladesh garment exports that Hosono 
discusses, Hujian is sending local employees for training to its parent 
company, with some 130 Ethiopian university graduates already sent to 
China by 2012/2013 and another batch of about 300 to follow. 
li j 
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According .to Abebe and Schaefer, it was easy to pick these sectors for 
support as they have "production organizations and technological inten-
sities that suit the labor-abundant-capital-scarce nature of the Ethiopian 
economy." Both sectors benefitted from a wide gamut of activist indus-
trial policies, and Abebe and Schaefer's study brings out both the com-
monalities in policy measures and also how policies were tailored to the 
specific requirements of each sector. 
The common elements in the industrial policy support of both sec-
tors of particular importance were (1) access to finance on reasonably 
attractive terms through the Development Bank of Ethiopia;22 (2) close 
government-business consultations; and (3) flexibility in altering forms 
and degrees of support. 
On the differences in approaches in the two sectors and the tailoring 
of policies to deal with sector-specific challenges, the following are note-
worthy: The leather sector was characterized by the need to overcome 
coordination failures that required several problems along the value chain 
to be tackled simultaneously to achieve global competitiveness. The dom-
inant challenges in the floriculture sector on the other hand, pertained to 
logistics, land acquisition, and initial capital (that needed to be financed 
at terms that were not too short term and costly for such investments). 
In the leather sector, the government aggressively promoted acquisi-
tion of technological capabilities, including establishing a leather training 
institure that organized several training programs often involving foreign 
experts, and also subsidized their employment by domestic firms. The 
government also provided land and semi-constructed factories as well as 
basic infrastructural facilities in industrial zones. Tax and regulatory poli-
cies were also employed to encourage upgrading. These included a ban 
on exports of raw hides and skins, followed in subsequent years by export 
taxes on minimally processed, low value-added, leather products. Such 
preannounced actions helped push "more innovative and efficient pro-
ducers up the value chain," as Abebe and Schaefer put it. 
In the case of cut flowers, industrial policies were tailored to provide 
land at reasonable prices and in proximity of the airport and reliable, low-
cost airfreight services including air-conditioned transport to the airport 
and coordination with Ethiopian Airlines so that its flight timetables got 
the flowers to overseas markets, especially Amsterdam, at the right time. 
The last of the set of case studies is the chapter by Annalisa Primi that 
seeks to answer the question of what lessons Africa can learn from the 
experiences in Latin America. She argues that whilst the "success" of East 
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Asia with industrial policies is often contrasted with the "failure" of Latin 
America, the latter has accumulated considerable experience in the design 
and implementation of industrial policies that have relevance for Africa. 
While recognizing the context specificity of appropriate policies, Primi 
holds that the Latin American experience, particularly in the past decade 
or so that has witnessed a revival of industrial policy in the region, can be 
utilized to derive useful lessons for Africa. 
Her starting point is the changing global landscapes that African as 
well as Latin American countries face in pursuing economic transforma-
tion today. Prirni points to a "new geography" of growth, production, 
trade, and innovation as a result of the rise of emerging economies, espe-
cially of China. By 2010, China had a larger share in the world's manu-
facturing value added than any other country: 18.9 percent compared to 
18.2 percent for the United States. While Africa has been deindustrializ-
ing, the share of non-OECD countries, even excluding China, in world 
manufacturing has been rising: from around 14 percent in 1990 to about 
20 percent in 2010. China, India, and Brazil have been growing in impor-
tance as Africis trade partners-and sources of FD I-with the share of 
China alone in Africis exports growing from roughly 5 percent in 2000 
to around 19 percent by 2010. Primi contends that these changes present 
new opportunities for transfers of technology and learning. 
Industrial policies are becoming more widespread, not only in Latin 
America but also in OECD countries with newer varieties of form, 
nuance, and emphasis, differing in important ways from the "classical" 
East Asian policies of the type pursued in Korea and Taiwan, for example. 
Understanding these policies could offer more learning opportunities 
for Africa. 
In Latin America, as in Africa, the WC policies led to a dismantling 
of industrial policies. In recent years, the region has faced the challenge 
of rebuilding the capabilities for designing and implementing industrial 
policy-what she refers to as the "planning function" of the state-afrer 
their evisceration during the heyday of the Washington Consensus. As 
such, Latin America and Africa can learn from each other. Among the 
lessons for Africa from the recent revival of industrial policies in Latin 
America that Prirni outlines are those that relate to: 
(1) The strategic management ofFDI to enhance technology transfers, 
and backward and forward linkages; 
(2) Building capabilities for learning in the management of public procurement; 
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(3) Setting up government programs to promote the creation of start-ups; 
(4) Development banks for channeling finance to production, development, 
and innovation (also see Griffith-Jones with Karwowski's contribution 
in this volume); 
(5) New furms of partnerships with the private sector to match funds 
and encourage innovation and production; 
(6) Channeling natural resource rents toward economic transformation 
(in particular through the creation of public funds for innovation 
and transformation); 
(7) Investing in Strengrhening relevant state capabilities, recognizing that 
the sequence of first getting the institutions and then the policies "right" 
does not make much sense because they co-evolve. 
The next chapter, by Stephany Griffith-Jones and Ewa Karwowski, 
focuses on the financial sector in Africa. Like Primi, they emphasize the 
important role that development banks can play-the more so because 
of very limited outside financing for investment by firms in Africa, with 
firms relying heavily on internally generated funds. This obviously con-
strains investment and thereby economic transformation. They point to 
the need for more research on development banks to learn from the fail-
ures and successes of the past. 
Griffith-Jones and Karwowski begin by examining the implications of 
the financial crisis of 2008 and its afrermath for financial sector policies 
in Africa. Their contribution includes an excellent, pithy review of the 
recent literature on the relationship between finance and growth. One 
upshot of the literature that they emphasize is the inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship between finance and growth. Up to a point financial depth is 
good for growth, but beyond that expansion of the financial sector seems 
to impede growth. They suggest one possible hypothesis for explaining 
this: that decreasing returns to financial depth reach a point at which the 
increased volatility that accompanies the expansion of the financial sector 
more than offsets the gains from it. 
While investment or long-terffi financing is very limited in Africa, 
there has been rapid growth of essentially short-term credit in several 
African countries in the later part of the 2000s. This has occurred in the 
context of limited regulatory and supervisory capacity, especially in some 
of them. Griffith-Jones and Karwowski note that there is general agree-
ment in the light of the 2008 crisis and its afrermath that regulations need 
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to be both countercyclical and comprehensive to minimize systemic risks. 
They argue for caution and prudence in financial liberalization in Africa, 
especially of cross-border capital flows. Their contribution also notes the 
special attention needed in the region to shape a financial sector that 
does a good job of serving the real economy for sustainable and inclusive 
growth, including notably lending to SMEs. This is, of course, of particu-
lar importance for industrial policies aimed at economic transformation. 
That the financial sectors in the region tend to be small in relation to 
the economy may facilitate shaping it appropriately. They also argue for 
substantially greater involvement of African and other low-income coun-
tries in discussions on financial regulations in international fora, such as 
the IMF, the Bank for International Sertlements (BIS), and the Financial 
Stability Board (FSB). 
The next chapter by Danny Leipziger and Shahid Yusuf delves into a 
very wide range of policy issues and controversies in making what it terms 
"policy observations" for growth strategies for Africa. In doing so it places 
a great deal of emphasis on a changing global context, rather similar to 
what Annalisa Primi's chapter does, but touching on many more issues, 
including the changing nature of technological trends, climate change, 
democratization, and the prospects for export-led manufacturing growth 
(which in its view are not particularly bright). 
To some degree this contribution can be said to add a rather different 
viewpoint (or at least emphasis) to that which underlies the preceding 
ones. Leipziger and Yusuf's support for industrial policies is more tepid 
and qualified both in itself and, at least to some degree, implicitly because 
of the relative importance they attribute to other policies for accelerated 
growth and transformation. While they are in broad agreement with 
Griffith-Jones and Karwowski on the dangers of excessive financial liber-
alization, they worry that regulations and restraints on finance can ham-
per growth. 
There are other areas of emphasis and nuance that are not entirely 
in consonance with the thrust of the rest of the volume. They are, for 
instance, more sympathetic with the good governance agenda to which 
we referred earlier in this introduction. Leipziger and Yusuf demonstrate 
that the debate over what will contribute to Africa's growth and develop-
ment is alive and well and has varied hues. 
Julia Cage's chapter brings the volume to an appropriate closure. We 
noted earlier that the Washington Consensus provided a well-articulated 
24 INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
view of what was required for successful development. Even when the 
policies seemed to fail, the response was less to change the policy but more 
to broaden the agenda to include the institutional reforms that we labeled 
as the good governance agenda. She subjects the different measures of 
"policy performance" that are being used by international organizations 
to rank countries on the "goodness" of their policies to critical analysis. 
Cage begins by noting the high-profile criticism by China regard-
ing its ranking on the "Doing Business" indicators that the World Bank 
churns out and that are so influential in measures of country policy per-
formance. They are supposed to assess the quality of the country's envi-
ronment for doing business. The implication is that countries with good 
scores on the "Doing Business" indicators will have a stronger private 
sector and will grow more robustly. While these indicators have rightly 
been criticized for seeming to suggest that having poor labor conditions 
and an unbalanced taX regime-fu.voring corporations-is good for busi-
ness and for the economy, the problems are deeper: China, the outstand-
ing case of growth and transformation that is having such a profound 
influence on the world economy-as Leipziger and Yusuf and Primi 
emphasize in this volume-ranks ninety-first out of r85 countries in 2or3 
(India does worse and Vietnam is close to China in "Doing Business" in 
recent years). 
Julia Cage focuses in particular on the World Bank's Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment ( CPIA) measures, probably the most influ-
ential of these composite measures. Her chapter begins with some anec-
dotal evidence on how the CPIA performs as a predictor of growth. 
She then employs a yearly panel data set of more than r40 developing 
countries covering the period from r977 to 2008. Both her anecdotal and 
econometric evidence find that CPIA is not a good predictor of future 
economic growth. Julia Cage argues for other, new measures of policy 
performance and for more weight to be given to the role and capacities of 
governments. She emphasizes the importance of measuring the quality of 
industrial policy, especially of export promotion strategies. 
Her chapter provides strong empirical verification of many of the 
claims made earlier in this introduction and elsewhere in the book: the 
policies advocated by the Washington Consensus do not lead to strong 
economic growth, development, and economic transformation. This 
book highlights the importance of an alternative set of policies that has 
demonstrably broad success, at least in a number of cases. 
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NOTES 
I. Chad's growth was concentrated in the first half of the 2000s and tapered off 
sharply in recent years with a drop in oil production and related foreign investment. 
2. For a more detailed discussion of the issues in this and the next section, se·e 
Noman and Stiglitz (2012) and Noman and Stiglitz (forthcoming). The discussion 
here draws heavily on these essays. 
3. There is some controversy on the relative roles of commodity booms and 
improved policies, but that the former have been very important is beyond dispute. 
4. John Williamson coined the term Washington Consensus, describing the consen-
sus of policies surrounding the reforms advocated by the Washington-based institu-
tions in Latin America. But the term has come to refer to a broader set of policies, 
advocated not only in Latin America but also in other developing countries. See 
Williamson (1989, 2008) and Stiglitz (2008b, 2008c). 
5. Though even here it was arguably wise to resist the policies of selling off licenses 
to foreign firms, instead focusing on procuring particular services from foreign provid-
ers. Moreover, in the presence of fast-changing technologies, there are distinct advan-
tages from maintaining flexibility. 
6. World Bank (2015). 
7. On East Asia, see, fot example, Amsden (1989, 2001), Wade (1990), and World 
Bank (1993). Ha-Joon Chang (2002) covers both East Asia as well as the developed 
countries of North America and Europe. 
8. Bangladesh provides what is arguably the most striking example of the impor-
tant role that such institutions can play as exemplified by BRAC and the Grarneen 
Baok. 
9. This is partly because of capital market imperfections: the new sectors typically 
have difficulties raising funds to finance new enterprises, and individuals have difficul-
ties raising funds to finance the new human capital required in the new sectors (see 
Delli Gatti et al. 20I2a and b). It is also because learning is central to transformation, 
and there are numerous market failures associated with learning. See Greenwald and 
Stiglitz (2014c). 
IO. In both India and Pakistan the green revolution was facilitated by policies of 
price support setting a floor on output prices, as well as input subsidies, including 
notably for electricity, that enhanced the profitability of tube-well irrigation. 
II. What constitutes a good patent law is another matter. The details of design 
make some entail more static losses and/or less dynamic gains than others. See, for 
example, Dosi and Stiglltz (2014) and Stiglitz (2008c). 
I2. Arguably, the East Asian countries did this very successfully. See references cited 
in previous endnote. 
lJ. Ha-Joon Chang (2003). 
14. Stiglitz (2002a) described the process of privatization in many countries as one 
of"briberization." Much of the inequality in wealth and income that has become such 
a subject of concern in recent years, which Stiglitz (10I2) has argued has had signifi-
cant adverse effects on growth and economic performance, arose out of these poorly 
designed privatizations. 
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15· See Jounian (204) for an excellent discussion on how the development of natu-
ral resources can be the basis of broader-based growth through the design of appropri-
ate industrial policies. 
16. Note that the real interest rate in the United States and Europe in recent years 
has been negative. Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz (r997 and r998) distinguish 
between the potentially beneficial effects of mild financial restraint (often associated 
with slightly negarive real interest rates) and financial repression (marked by highly 
negative real interest rates). 
17. In Africa, the failures often stemmed from some combination of poor governance 
of such banks, 'With loans often given on the basis of political influence rather than the 
merit of the project, and an economic environment characterized by macroeconomic 
instability and other policy failingi;, especially of trade and exchange rate policies. 
r8. Emran and Stiglitz (1009) provide a theoretical explanation for why, without 
government intervention, there will be an undersupply of loans to small businesses. 
19. For more elaborate discussions of the case for industrial policies in recent years, 
see Greenwald and Stiglitz (2or4a, b, and c); Lin (2or2); Aghion (104); Cimoli, Dosi, 
and Stiglitz (1009); and Stiglirz, Lin, and Patel (104). There are also ofcourse the clas-
sic works of Alice Amsden (r989, 2oor) and Robert Wade (r990). 
20. For a more elaborate and derailed case along similar lines, see the contributions 
of Akbar Noman and Joseph Stiglirz, Thandika Mkandawire, Mushtaq Khan, and 
Meles Zena'Wi in Noman et al. (1012). 
21. Also for comparison: Bangladesh's annual economic growth during the period 
was 6.2 percent. 
22. Ethiopia is rare in Africa in still having a devdopment bank after the wave of 
financial liberalization that closed down such banks not only in Africa but in many 
other developing countries. 
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